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CORPORATIONS-STOCKHOLDERS-EFFECT OF STATE CONSTITUTIONAL PRO-
VISIONS ON LIABILITY TO CREDITORS FOR UNPAID SUBSCRIPTIONS-Basset and 
Company, an Oklahoma corporation, issued stock to defendant for which 
defendant never paid. The sum due was carried on the corporate books as 
"subscriptions receivable." The corporation became bankrupt and the 
trustee brought suit in the federal district court to recover the amount due 
on the subscriptions. Held, judgment for the defendant. Under the 
Oklahoma Constitution, where stock is issued for consideration which is 
less than par value, the issue is void.1 The stock certificate cannot serve as 
a consideration to support the would-be stockholder's promise to pay for 
the stock, and no liability attaches to the stockholder except where his un-
fulfilled promise works a fraud upon innocent third persons. Stone v. 
Hudgens, (D. C. Okla. 1955) 129 F. Supp. 273. 
Absent any statute or constitutional provision, the stockholders of an 
insolvent corporation are liable to creditors of the corporation for the 
amount unpaid on their subscriptions for stock, to the extent payment is 
necessary to satisfy the claims of those creditors.2 This liability is based 
upon either of two grounds, not always clearly distinguished by the courts.3 
First, where the action is to enforce an unpaid subscription price agreed 
to by the stockholder, the action is ex contractu in nature and the creditor 
steps into the shoes of the corporation in order to enforce an obligation 
1 OKLA. CoNsr., art. 9, §39. 
2 In re Caledonia Coal Co., (D.C. Mich. 1918) 254 F. 742; 13 FLETCHER, CYC. CORP. 
§6051 (1943). 
s For a discussion of these alternative theories of liability, see Spencer v. Anderson, 
193 Cal. 1 at 5, 222 P. 355 (1924); 35 MICH. L. REv. 108 (1936). 
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owed to it by the subscriber.4 But where the corporation has agreed to 
transfer shares to the subscriber for less than pru; value and to recognize 
those shares as being fully paid, the creditors, upon insolvency, could not 
recover on a contract theory since the corporation would be bound by its 
contract with the subscriber. However, under these circumstances the 
creditor can still recover from the subscriber the difference between the 
consideration paid to the corporation and the par value of the shares 
received in exchange.5 This second basis for recovery is justified either on 
the ground that the unpaid balance represents a "trust fund" for the 
benefit of creditors,6 or, more recently, that the failure to pay par value is 
a fraud on creditors.7 
It is in this context that a constitutional provision such as that involved 
in the principal case must be considered.8 It is clear that the provision 
was intended to give added protection to investors and creditors by pro-
hibiting the practice of "stock-watering."9 The cases indicate, however, 
that the provision has not had the desired effect. It has not added to the 
rights of creditors because, in general, the courts have not construed the 
provision as, in and of itself, requiring payment of par value, or as giving 
rise, assuming that voidness is established, to any liability of the subscriber 
for the unpaid balance.10 Thus, in those states where a shareholder would 
not be liable under common law for having paid less than par value for 
"fully paid" shares,11 this provision would not, without more, change the 
result. On the other hand, the provision has not decreased the right of 
creditors to recover on watered stock when the action is founded on the 
"trust fund" or fraud theory. Since the claim is based on tort and not on 
contract, a provision that the contract under which the shares were issued 
4 The court in Spencer v. Anderson, note 8 supra, describes this as" ••• in the nature 
of an equitable garnishment in aid of execution." 
IS See notes 6 and 7 infra. Southworth v. Morgan, 205 N.Y. 293, 98 N.E. 490 (1912) is 
representative of a minority of decisions holding that, even where there was sale at a 
discount or stock-watering involved, the creditors' rights are not greater than those of the 
corporation. . 
6 The leading case is Scovill v. Thayer, 105 U.S. 143 (1882). In Chilson v. Cavanagh, 
61 Okla. 98, 160 P. 601 (1916), this doctrine is cited with apparent approval. See also 
Guinness v. Remick, 228 Mich. 461, 200 N.W. 120 (1924). 
7 Hospes v. Northwestern Mfg. and Car Co., 48 Minn. 174, 50 N.W. lll7 (1892); Collier 
v. Edwards, 109 Okla. 153, 234 P. 720 (1924). For discussions of these common law 
doctrines and the effect of statutes upon them, see Donn, STOCK WATERING, c. I (1930), 
and Bonbright, "Shareholders' Defenses Against Liability to Creditors on Watered Stock," 
25 COL. L. REv. 408 {1925). 
s OKLA. CONST., art. 9, §39, provides in part: "No corporation shall issue stock except 
for money, labor done, or property actually received to the amount of the .par value 
thereof, and all fictitious increase of stock or indebtedness shall be void .•.. " 
9 Lee v. Cameron, 67 Okla. 80 at 82, 169 P. 17 (1917); ll FLETCHER, CYC. CoRP., §5209 
(1932). 
10 See the discussion in ll FLETCHER, CYc. CORP. 495 (1932), and in Bonbright, "Share-
holders' Defenses Against Liability to Creditors on Watered Stock," 25 CoL. L. REv. 408 
at 414 (1925). 
11 Southworth v. Morgan, note 5 supra. 
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shall be null and void does not affect the creditors' rights of recovery.12 
This is so since there is still a misrepresentation-to the effect that the 
shares have been fully paid for-and reliance on that misrepresentation.13 
Thus, in Oklahoma, the creditor can still recover against the shareholder 
who has not paid in full for his shares, where he can establish a representa-
tion that they were fully paid.14 In the absence of such a representation, 
however, and where the creditor is suing on the contract for unpaid sub-
scriptions, the principal case holds that, under the constitutional provision 
referred to, the creditor cannot recover.15 Logically, this is_ sound, since it 
is difficult to perceive how a creditor can recover on a contract which is 
null and void. But it produces the anomalous result that a constitutional 
provision which was designed to give added protection to creditors has 
resulted in a decrease in the protection which they would have had at 
common law.16 The better approach, therefore, would be to construe the 
language in the light of what it was intended to do, and to hold that, 
whatever the liability as between corporation and shareholder,17 the share-
holder cannot use the constitutional provision to escape liability to 
corporate creditors upon his promise.18 
Douglas Peck, S.Ed. 
12 See 35 MICH. L. REv. 108 at 113 (1936), citing duPont v. Ball, 11 Del. Ch. 430, 106 
A. 39 (1918). But see Lavell v. Bullock, 43 N.D. 135, 174 N.W. 764 (1919), where three of 
the justices indicated that, even in a fraud action, voidness of the stock issue is a defense. 
13 "Reliance" in these cases is generally presumed. Hospes v. Northwestern Mfg. and 
Car Co., note 7 supra. 
14 This is codified in 18 Okla. Stat. (1951) §1.83. See Paxton v. Hyer, 184 Okla. 407, 
87 P. (2d) 938 (1939), interpreting the statutory predecessor of this provision. This right 
of recovery extends only to creditors without knowledge. Collier v. Edwards, 144 Okla. 69, 
289 P. 260 (1930). 
15 Principal case at 275. 
16 See notes 2 and 3 supra and adjacent text. 
17 See 35 MICH. L. REv. 108 (1936). 
18 Bell v. Aubel, 151 Pa. Super. 569, 30 A. (2d) 617 (1943); Tooker v. National Sugar 
Refining Co., 80 N.J. Eq. 305, 84 A. 10 (1912). In Bottlers Seal Co. v. Rainey, 243 N.Y. 
333, 153 N.E. 437 (1926), this result is reached on the basis of a statute providing for 
shareholder liability. But see Collier v. Edwards, note 14 supra, involving a similar stat}lte. 
